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Reflections on an imagined second Kennedy administration
With the approach of the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, James D.
Boys reflects back on JFK’s unfinished presidency. He notes that Kennedy is often judged on his
promise, rather than his substantial achievements in office, and imagines a second Kennedy
administration, speculating that without the emotion created by Kennedy’s death, the Civil Rights
Act would not have passed Congress. 
50 years after his assassination in Dallas, Texas, President John F. Kennedy continues to rank as
one of the most popular chief executives in American history. He was, of course, only in office for
a little over a thousand days, leading to obvious questions as to the rationale for his high standing, especially
considering that most Americans alive today have no living memory of his administration.
Perhaps more than any other president,
JFK is judged to a great extent on his
promise, as opposed to his specific
achievements in office. However, this is a
situation that risks undermining the
feeling of euphoria that he brought to the
presidency as well as his great
achievements in office; of saving the
world during the Cuban Missile Crisis and
his work in securing the first nuclear test
ban treaty, signed shortly before his fatal
trip to Texas. Kennedy set the tone for an
idealised, romanticised presidency that
many, if not all, of his successors have
sought to emulate and against which, all
have come up short.
Indeed, the fact that both Republicans
and Democrats have sought to emulate
or bask in Kennedy’s reflected glory speaks to the importance of his presidency. He redefined the office in terms of
public relations, style and image. Alas, his imitators have all too often failed to see the substance behind the smile.
He prevented Armageddon over Cuba, repeatedly refused to commit ground troops to Vietnam, initiated the Apollo
mission to the moon, signed a nuclear test ban treaty with the UK and the USSR, committed the United States’
government to the passing of civil rights legislation, created the Peace Corps and committed to a phased
withdrawal of all US personnel from Vietnam by 1965, with the first 1,000 advisers due home by Christmas 1963.
During his 1,000 days in office, John F. Kennedy redefined the office of the presidency in terms of its ability to
motivate and inspire a nation and, to a great extent, the world.
Having grown substantially in office, Kennedy was not taking re-election for granted. His trip to Texas marked the
beginning of an anticipated year-long campaign to secure a second term. The great unknown element is what
would Kennedy have addressed between 1964 and January 1969 and how would this differ from what occurred
under Lyndon Johnson? Historians and commentators routinely suggest that either little would differ (as LBJ
retained Kennedy’s cabinet), or else that Kennedy’s living presence would have resulted in a far more equitable
and peaceful world.
The truth, however, would certainly have been somewhere in-between. Having repeatedly refused to commit
ground troops to Southeast Asia during his first term, Kennedy would have continued his efforts to ensure that the
Vietnam withdrawal, commenced in the fall of 1963, was completed on schedule. While this would naturally have
a great benefit for those Americans not impacted by the draft, (particularly African Americans), there would likely
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be a major downside to a second Kennedy Administration. Having won re-election JFK would have struggled to
pass the planned Civil Rights legislation due to vehement opposition, not only from Republicans, but primarily from
Southern Democrats.
Lyndon Johnson’s ability to pass the
1964 and 1965 bills was due in large
part, to his willingness to exploit the
assassination as an emotional rationale
to manipulate members of Congress.
Even so, this was achieved at the loss of
the Democratic grip on the southern
states, which in 2013, continue to be
dominated by Republicans. Kennedy,
without LBJ’s mastery of Congress and
without the emotional leverage caused
by his own demise, almost certainly
would have failed to pass the legislation
that he had introduced. This would have
had major implications for African
Americans and ensured that the
Republican Solid south that emerged in
1968 would not have materialised, with
implications for future presidential
elections.
Further afield, a planned state visit to Moscow may have helped keep Nikita Khrushchev in power and enable
Kennedy and Khrushchev to develop their relationship that had begun to improve after the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Having signed the test ban treaty, the two men could easily have implemented the vital lessons that they had
learnt from the Cuban crisis.
Counter-factual history has its detractors, but it is fascinating tool with which to consider a 1960s dominated by an
8 year term for JFK, devoid of the turmoil of Vietnam, but without the leap forward in civil rights that was only
achieved in the aftermath of Kennedy’s assassination.
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